

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		3 Oct
TO: NIO Street 7		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
For appropriate action — here is a true cy of the document I sent along to you 31 Sep.		
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ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

*will ask for a letter
CY from N6C.*

3/1/90

STAT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 23, 1977

12 OCT 1977

James +
Plan B/M
extra copy

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY POLICY

SUBJECT: Arms Control for Antisatellite (ASAT) Systems

The President has reviewed the subject decision paper submitted by the Chairman, PRM/NSC-23 Policy Review Committee, and has approved Approach Four as the desired goal for our negotiations with the Soviets. This approach seeks a relatively comprehensive agreement which would ban all ASAT capabilities except electronic warfare. The ban would prohibit testing in space or against objects in space, deployment, or use of any ASAT for physical attack on satellites. The current Soviet orbital interceptor would be dismantled.

Further, the President has directed continuation of our own research and development (R&D) on ASAT systems pending an agreement. These programs should be vigorously pursued with a comprehensive R&D program short of operational or space-based testing, carrying to production only those elements which we cannot get the Soviets to include in a treaty. Beyond that, some R&D should be continued as a hedge against Soviet breakout. The policy for public release of information on U.S. ASAT development will be to enhance the likelihood of Soviet acceptance of the U.S. proposals.

~~TOP SECRET~~ (GDS)

Classified by Z. Brzezinski

(EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FILE)

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PRM # 23


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Finally, the President directs that the U. S. Government insist on strict terms in any agreement regarding discontinuance of testing, use and dismantling of projected or current Soviet ASAT capabilities. Emphasis is to be placed on the verifiability of the specific agreement to be proposed pursuant to this directive, with vigorous pursuit of a program to insure the capability to verify agreements reached. The first order of business with the Soviets should be to seek a prompt end to their ASAT testing.

An SCC Working Group including members from ACDA and DOD should develop detailed terms of reference and negotiation work packages for Special Coordination Committee review.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

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